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McTAGGART'S PARADOX AND SMITH'S TENSED THEORY 
OF TIME 
ABSTRACT. Since McTaggart first proposed his paradox asserting the unreality of time, 
numerous philosophers have attempted to defend the tensed theory of time against it. 
Certainly, one of the most highly developed and original is that put forth by Quentin Smith. 
Through discussing McTaggart's positive conception of time as well as his negative attack 
on its reality, I hope to clarify the dispute between those who believe in the existence 
of the transitory temporal properties ofpastness, presentness and futurity, and those who 
deny their existence. We shall see that the debate centers around the ontological status of 
succession and the B-relations of earlier and later. I shall argue that Smith's tensed theory 
fails because he cannot account for the sense in which events have their tensed properties 
successively, and he cannot account for the direction of time. 
McTaggart's Paradox has fascinated philosophers since it was originally 
presented. In his famous essay on 'The Unreality of Time', McTaggart 
argues that since the essence of time is temporal passage - the change 
events undergo when they move from the future through the present and 
into the pas t -  and since temporal passage is contradictory, time is contra- 
dictory, and therefore unreal. 1 There are two basic steps in his argument: 
(1) temporal passage is the essence of time and (2) temporal passage is 
contradictory. Nowadays, few, if any, philosophers accept McTaggart's 
argument, and their rejection of it is based upon a denial of one of the 
two basic steps. Detensers (like myself) deny (1) and accept (2), whereas 
tensers accept (1) and deny (2). Although I will have something to say 
about McTaggart's reasoning in support of step (1), the main concern of 
this paper will be step (2); the thesis that temporal passage is contradictory. 
There have been several recent versions of the tensed theory of time that 
have attempted to avoid McTaggart's conclusion, but the most sophisticat- 
ed is that put forth by Quentin Smith. 2 Thus, after explaining McTaggart's 
positive conception of time, and his argument for its unreality, I shall con- 
sider Smith's recent attempt to avoid McTaggart's conundrum and argue 
that it is inadequate. 
Synthese 107: 205-221, 1996. 
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1. McTAGGART'S POSITIVE VIEW OF TIME 
Though it is debatable whether or not time involves change, it is surely 
not debatable that change involves time. For if we are to understand how a 
single thing can have incompatible properties, and thus satisfy one essential 
ingredient of change, we must in some way specify the different times 
at which it possesses those properties. What, then, is time? McTaggart's 
thesis is that we must understand time in terms of temporal passage, and we 
must understand temporal passage in terms of the property of presentness 
moving across an ordered but non-temporal C-series. 
To see what is involved in this point consider three different descriptions 
of the fact of change. 
(1) The apple is green before it is red. 
(2) The apple is green at tl and red at t2. 
(3) The apple is now green and will be red. 
For the purposes of distinguishing three different ontological assays of 
time we will distinguish the different states of affairs that (1), (2) and (3) 
describe. On the first analysis time is relational, that is, the only intrinsically 
temporal entities are the B-relations of simultaneity, earlier and later, and 
change is reflected in the apple's being green occurring before the apple 
is red. On the second alternative time is absolute. There are intrinsically 
temporal individuals called "moments" and change is reflected by the apple 
having different and incompatible properties at (or relative to) different 
moments of absolute time. On the third account, time is tensed, and change 
is reflected in the different non-relational temporal qualities of presentness, 
pastness and futurity that events in the A-series acquire and shed. 
According to McTaggart, the ontologically most perspicuous descrip- 
tion of time and change is reflected in statements such as (3), for apart from 
the A-series with its distinctions of past, present and future, (1) and (2) do 
not reflect the fact of genuine temporal change. As we shall see, however, 
his reasoning is not very convincing since it is based on the assumption 
that he is trying to prove, namely, that without the A-series all that really 
exists is a non-temporal C-series. 
Consider his argument against the claim that the B-series, (containing 
facts of the sort reflected by (1)), does not adequately represent change. 
He reasons that time involves change and therefore if the B-series alone 
is to constitute time (as the detenser maintains) then it too must involve 
change. But, he continues, there is nothing in the B-series which changes. 
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Since sentences which describe temporal relations between events are 
always true, it follows, according to McTaggart, that events in the B-series 
always exist and so do not change by coming into existence and going 
out of existence. Nor do events in the B-series change their relations to 
each other. Consequently, if the B-series is to be a time-series, then its 
terms (events) must exemplify the temporal characteristics of pastness, 
presentness, and futurity and change with respect to them as time passes. 
In other words, time (temporal relations) and change require an A-series 
and temporal becoming. 
McTaggart states this conclusion in The Nature of Existence: 
. . .  the series of earlier and later is a time series. We cannot have time without change, and 
the only possible change is from future to present, and from present to past. Thus, until the 
terms are taken as passing from future to present, and from present to past, they cannot be 
taken as in time, or as earlier or later; and not only the conception of presentness, but those 
of pastness and futurity must be reached before the conceptions of earlier and later and not 
vice versa. (1927, p. 271) 
Thus, the first and essential point concerning McTaggart's positive concep- 
tion of time is that while both the A-series and the B-series are essential 
to our ordinary thought and experience of time, the A-series and tem- 
poral becoming is more fundamental to the real metaphysical nature of 
time since temporal or B-relations are dependent upon temporal becoming 
(or A-properties). To put the same point otherwise, on McTaggart's posi- 
tive conception of time, B-relations are not there from the outset but are 
generated by the moving of the NOW along a non-temporal, but ordered 
C-series. 
McTaggart believes that the above argument holds even if we enrich 
our ontology with temporal individuals or moments of absolute time, and 
describe the fact of change by sentences like (2). For even if the apple is 
green at tl and red at t2, there is still nothing about either of those facts 
that changes. As McTaggart puts it, 'it is always a fact about the poker [or 
apple] that it is cold at one point in time and hot at another' (1927, p. 27). 
Thus, if (2) is to reflect the fact of change, then something more is needed: 
the apple's being green and the apple's being red (as well as the times at 
which those events occur) must themselves change from being future to 
being present to being past. 
McTaggart's argument against absolute and relational time can also 
be expressed by claiming that a series whose terms stand in unchanging 
relations, but do not have A-characteristics, is not a temporal series. For, 
if a series of terms do not have changing A-characteristics then they do 
not have a direction, and without a direction the series is indistinguishable 
from an unchanging spatial series. 
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C. D. Broad once expressed the difference be tween t ime and space b y  
saying that whereas  a series o f  points in space have an intrinsic order, the 
pecul iar i ty  o f  a series o f  events in t ime is that it not only  has an intrinsic 
order, but also an intrinsic sense or direction: 
Three points on a line have an intrinsic order, i.e., B is between A and C, or C is between 
B and A, or A is between C and B. This order is independent of any tacit reference to 
something traversing the line in a certain direction. By a difference in sense I mean the sort 
of difference which there is between say, ABC and CBA. Now points on a straight line do 
not have an intrinsic sense. (Broad 1959, p. 57) 
The point  Broad  is getting at m a y  be clarified by  noting that the change 
o f  an apple f rom green to red is a change in a given or intrinsic direction 
because  the apple isf irst  green and then red, or synonymously ,  it is green 
before it is red f rom any point  o f  view. In this respect  t ime differs f rom 
space since a spatial series has a direction only in reference to something 
external to the series. Thus,  in order to account  for ( temporal)  change,  that 
is, how one and the same thing can first have a proper ty  and then lose it, 
we  mus t  be  able to account  for the direction o f  t ime and the difference 
be tween  the temporal  change o f  the color o f  an apple and spatial "change"  
of, say, the color o f  a lawn f rom being green at one end and brown at the 
other. 
McTaggar t  concurs that there must  be  something more  to temporal  
change than an ordered series o f  qualitatively different terms. As he puts 
it: 
More is wanted, however, for the genesis of a B-series and time than simply the C-series 
and the fact of change. For change must be in a particular direction. And the C-series, 
while it determines the order, does not determine the direction. If the C-series runs M, N, O, 
P, then the B-series . . .  can run either M, N, O, P (so that M is earliest and P latest) or else 
P, O, N, M (so that P is earliest and M latest). And there is nothing either in the C-series or 
in the fact of change to determine which it will be. (1934, pp. 116-117; emphasis added.) 
Clearly, then, for McTaggart ,  something more  is essential to t ime and 
change than the C-series,  but what  more?  Alternatively, how are we  to 
account  for the direction o f  t ime and its difference f rom space? 
We should not  be surprised to read that McTaggar t ' s  account  o f  the 
direction o f  t ime and change depends upon  the A-series: 
We can now see that the A-series, together with the C-series, is sufficient to give us time. 
For in order to get change, and change in a given direction, it is sufficient that one position 
in the C-series should be Present, to the exclusion of all others, and that this characteristic 
of presentness should pass along the series in such a way that all positions on the one side 
of the Present have been present, and all positions on the other side of it will be present. 
. . .  [N]o other elements are required to constitute a time-series except an A-series and a 
C-series . . . .  It is only when the A-series, which gives change and direction, is combined 
with the C-series, which gives permanence, that the B-series can arise. (1934, p. 118) 
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This passage further supports my interpretation of McTaggart's positive 
views on time according to which a concept of time involving a temporal 
A-series and a non-temporal C-series is necessary and sufficient to account 
for the transitory and the relational aspects of our common notion of 
time. Thus, on McTaggart's positive tensed theory of time the fact of 
change and the direction of time can be accounted for without presupposing 
unanalyzable temporal relations. On his theory, temporal relations are not 
ultimate, but are analyzable in terms of the moving NOW. 
There is much that is objectionable in McTaggart's positive conception 
of time and in his criticism of the view that time consists solely of B- 
relations. The weakness I want to focus on concerns an ambiguity in his 
conception and use of the C-series. On the one hand, before McTaggart 
proves that time is unreal he introduces the C-series as a permanent, non- 
temporal, ordered series of terms which, together with the A-series, is 
the ontological ground of the B-series. On the other hand, after he has 
allegedly disproved the reality of time McTaggart introduces the C-series 
in order to explain how it is that we misperceive the B-series as a time 
series. This ambiguity presents a problem for McTaggart. The existence of 
the C-series as an ordered, but non-temporal series whose terms are in one- 
one correspondence with the terms of the B-series, is a theoretical posit 
introduced to explain how it is that we seem to experience events in time 
as forming a B-series. Thus, his use of the C-series is justified only after 
he has disproved the reality of time. Yet his argument against the B-series 
as well as his positive conception of time assume that the existence of the 
C-series is logically prior to that of the B-series (since they assume that a 
B-series without an A-series is a space-like C-series), and so they assume 
what needs to be proved. 
The issue between the tenseless and the (predominant) tensed theory 
of time can now be put clearly into focus. McTaggart claims that if time 
is real - if there is genuine succession - then the ontological ground of 
that succession must be the non-relational temporal properties exemplified 
by events and moments of time, if there are moments of time. Detensers 
reject the moving NOW and the monadic property of presentness, but 
nevertheless maintain that genuine succession exists and that the B-series 
alone contains the fact of change. Russell (1915), Broad (1921), Shorter 
(1984), Oaklander (1984), Williams (1994) and others have maintained 
that temporal relations are primitive and unanalyzable relations, and the 
difference between spatial and temporal relations is an irreducible quali- 
tative difference. From this perspective, it is a mistake to suppose that if 
time is the mere succession of events, then the change involved is exactly 
like the spatial "change" in the color of the lawn one observes as one walks 
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from the front to the back. On this view, the relation that distinguishes 
temporal order is just different from any spatial relation in the same sense 
that red and green are just different. Other detensers such as Grtinbaum 
(1973), Mellor (1981) and Le Poidevin (1991), have maintained that tem- 
poral relations are definable in terms of causal relations and the direction of 
time is grounded in the direction of causality. Whether temporal relations 
are definable or not, detensers have rejected the tensed theorist's claim 
that temporal relations are dependent upon either tensed properties, tensed 
facts, or the passage of time. 
Having clarified McTaggart's positive conception of time we can turn to 
the second step in McTaggart's argument where he attempts to demonstrate 
that time is contradictory, and therefore unreal. 
2. MCTAGGART'S ARGUMENT FOR THE UNREALITY OF TIME 
The main argument by which McTaggart attempts to prove that time is 
unreal may be stated as follows: 
(1) If the application of a concept to reality implies contradiction, 
then that concept cannot be true of reality. 
(2) Time involves (stands or falls) with the A-series and temporal 
becoming; that is, if the A-series involves a contradiction then 
time involves a contradiction. 
(3) The application of the A-series and temporal becoming to reality 
involves a contradiction. 
(4) Therefore, neither the A-series nor temporal becoming can be 
true of reality; thus time is unreal. 
In support of step (3) McTaggart argues simply that if events move through 
time from the future to the present to the past, (or if presentness moves 
across the C-series) then every item in time must be past, present and future. 
However, past, present and future are incompatible properties. Thus, the 
existence of the moving NOW entails a contradiction- every event both is 
and is not past, present and future - and time is unreal. 
McTaggart was aware that the contradiction appears to have an obvious 
resolution if we specify the various times or when events have incompatible 
temporal properties. He went on to argue, however, that the appeal to time, 
that is, succession, to avoid the original contradiction contained in temporal 
attributions involves either a vicious circle or a vicious infinite regress. 
Appealing to succession involves a vicious circle because 
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it assumes the existence of time in order to account for the way in which moments are 
past, present, and future. Time then must be presupposed to account for the A-series. But 
we have already seen that the A-series has to be assumed in order to account for time. 
Accordingly, the A-series has to be presupposed in order to account for the A-series. And 
this is clearly a vicious circle. (McTaggart 1934, p. 118) 
In short, in order to account for something having incompatible temporal 
properties the defender of  passage must assume that the term in question has 
those properties in succession, but in order for a term to be first future, then 
present, and then past, we must assume that it has incompatible temporal 
properties. Thus, one cannot appeal to succession in order to explain how 
time and change are possible without falling into a vicious circle. 
To develop this last point further, recall that an account of  time must 
provide an account of  say, an apple'sfirst being green and then being red, 
or synonymously, its being green before it is red. McTaggart's account of  
change involves the claim that every event in the apple's history changes 
with respect to the properties ofpastness, presentness, and futurity. Howev- 
er, A-changes in events can account for time and avoid the incompatibilities 
problem only if events gain and lose A-properties successively. Unfortu- 
nately, given McTaggart's positive conception of  time that can only mean 
thatfirst the apple's being green is present and the apple's being red is 
future, and then the apple's being green is past and the apple's being red 
is present, or more simply, that the green apple is present before the red 
apple is present. As the italicized words indicate, however, time or more 
specifically, the temporal relation of earlier than, must be assumed in order 
to account for A-changes in events, that is, for events having incompatible 
A-characteristics. But as McTaggart says, "we have already seen that the 
A-series has to be assumed in order to account for time" (since the B-series 
is defined in terms of the application of the A-series to the C-series). In 
other words, given the existence of  a contradiction in the original A-series, 
we cannot avoid it by appealing to the relation of succession because the 
A-series has to be assumed to account for the succession and therefore, 
since the A-series is involved in paradox, succession is too. 
McTaggart's difficulty with temporal predication can be put differently, 
in which the fallacy will exhibit itself as a vicious infinite regress rather 
than as a vicious circle. If we avoid the contradiction by claiming that E is 
future at tl ,  present at t2 and past at t3, then tl,  t2 and t3 must refer to differ- 
ent moments of time. For if the events do not have their A-characteristics 
at different times, then they are either timelessly or simultaneously past, 
present and future and a contradiction ensues. What, then, is the basis of  
tl being earlier than t2, and t2 being earlier than t3? Given McTaggart's 
analysis it can only be that Presentness moves along the series of moments 
in such a way that each moment is past, present and future. But then, the 
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contradiction in the (first) level of  events arises again at the (second) level 
of  moments at which the preceding level can have its temporal properties. 
For this new series is genuinely temporal only if its terms occur in a given 
direction, but the direction of  a series is generated by temporal attribut- 
ions which has not yet been freed from contradiction. Thus, McTaggart 
concludes, whether we stop at a contradiction, or at the denial of  genuine 
(A-series) change, time is unreal. 
There is another way to understand McTaggart's argument. McTaggart 
claims that in order to distinguish a temporal from a spatial series one must 
ground the direction of  time. In order to give time a direction, however, 
the different terms must have o n e  a n d  o n l y  one  non-relational temporal 
characteristic. For if a is past, b is present and c is future, then we can read 
off the change in the direction of  a is earlier than c, rather than c is earlier 
than a. However, unless a, b and c change their temporal characteristics 
there is no genuine change. Hence, each of  the terms must have the other 
two temporal characteristics as well, but then we can no longer determine 
the direction of  the change, whether from a to c or c to a. 
Critics of  McTaggart, such as Broad (1938), Levison (1987), Lowe 
(1987a), Prior (1967, 1968), Smith (1993) and others have been quick to 
point out that since there is no contradiction to be avoided in the first place, 
as no event ever is (nonsuccessively) past, present, and future (or present 
and not present), there is no need to set off on an infinite regress in order 
to avoid it. As Broad puts it: 
I cannot myself see that there is any contradiction to be avoided. When it is said that 
pastness, presentness, and futurity are incompatible predicates, this is true only in the sense 
that no one term could have two of them simultaneously or timelessly. Now no term ever 
appears to have any of them simultaneously. What appears to be the case is that certain 
terms have them successively. Thus, there is nothing in the temporal appearance to suggest 
that there is a contradiction to be avoided. (Broad 1938, p. 313) 
Of  course whether that response is adequate depends on how one unpacks 
the notion of  s u c c e s s i o n .  According to tensers, if we take tense seriously, 
then E is past, present and future is never true. What is true is that 
E is present, was future and will be past, or E is past, and was present and (still earlier) was 
past or E is future, will be present and will be (still later) past. 
The dominant issue surrounding recent discussions of  McTaggart's paradox 
is whether the appeal to tense can be given an interpretation that will resolve 
the difficulties with temporal passage. 
According to defenders of  the tenseless theory of  time, none of  the 
solutions to McTaggart's paradox and related problems are successful, and 
so they conclude we must give up the idea that events form a real A-series 
and change with respect to their temporal location in it. For detensers, 
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'past' ,  'present'  and 'future' are indexical expressions whose referent can- 
not be separated from the time of  utterance, or from the utterance itself. 
Thus, for example, on the token-reflexive account that Mellor propounds, 
the temporal relation between the date at which one says, thinks, or writes 
down a tensed sentence and the event or thing that it is about provides 
an objective basis for the truth value of any tensed sentence. A present 
tense sentence token is true if and only if it occurs (exists tenselessly) at 
(roughly) the same time as the event it is about; a past tense token is true 
if and only if it occurs at a time later than the event it refers to, and so on 
(Mellor 1981,5-7). Thus, on the token-reflexive account, the facts in virtue 
of  which tensed sentence tokens are true are tenseless. Tensers, however, 
cannot accept this way out of  McTaggart's paradox since to do so is to 
leave out something essential to time, namely, temporal passage. They are 
obliged, therefore, to make sense of the tensed theory of time while also 
avoiding McTaggart's paradox. In what follows I shall critically discuss 
Quentin Smith's recent attempt to accomplish that task. 
3. SMITH'S RESPONSE TO MCTAGGART'S PARADOX 
In his recent writings Quentin Smith has argued that "the idea that pre- 
sentness, pastness and futurity are properties does indeed entail an infinite 
regress, but that this regress is neither vicious nor constituted of tenseless 
[or simultaneous] predications". (Smith 1994a, p. 180; cf. 1994b, 1993.) 
In the remainder of  this paper I want to explain why I do not believe that 
Smith's interpretation of  the tenses succeeds in avoiding the vicious infinite 
regress of  temporal attributions that McTaggart claimed to uncover in his 
paradox. 
Let us begin with the three statements: "E is now present", and "E is now 
past", and "E is now future". These are mutually contradictory unless it is 
specified that E has these incompatible properties successively. "In tensed 
language", Smith writes, "this means that the event is present, will be past 
and has been future or that it is past, and has been future and present, or 
that it is future and will be present and past" (1994a, p. 181). According to 
Smith, the reality of  temporal attributes as reflected in his analysis of  the 
tenses implies an infinite regress of inherences of  presentness inhering in 
their own inherences. That is, the correct analysis of  "E is present" is "E 
is present, and the being present of  E is present, and the being present of 
the being present of  E is present, and so on infinitely" (1994a, p. 185). He 
explains this by saying that 
the first conjunct predicates presentness of the event E and each of the remaining con- 
juncts predicates presentness of a different inherence of presentness; the second conjunct 
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predicates presentness of the inherence1 of presentness in E, the third conjunct predicates 
presentness of the inherence/of presentness in its inherence in E, and so on. (1994a, p. 
187) 
This passage makes it clear that for Smith, inherence exemplifies the tem- 
poral attribute of presentness. 
Similarly, the correct analysis of "E is past" and "E is future" involves 
the inherence of presentness in an infinite number of inherence relations. 
Thus, Smith says, "[T]he correct explication of"E is past" is E is past, and 
the being past of E is present, and the being present of the being past of E 
is present, and so on infinitely. An analogous complete explication is given 
to "E is future" (Smith 1994a, p. 187). 
In an earlier paper I argued that Smith's account of the tenses does not 
escape McTaggart's paradox since to avoid an event's having incompat- 
ible A-properties simultaneously he is forced to maintain that inherence 
relations have incompatible A-properties simultaneously (1987). Smith 
objected that my argument assumes that events or inherence relations have 
their tensed properties nonsuccessively. He continues, 
But Oaklander gives no justification for this assumption. Like McTaggart he simply asserts 
that whatever possesses the three temporal properties must possess them simultaneously. 
By importing this unjustified and foreign assumption into the tensed theory of time, Oak- 
lander, like McTaggart, proceeds to deduce the incoherence of the tensed theory. But this 
assumption is not a part of the tensers theory of time. According to this theory, something 
[e.g., an event or an inherence relation] possesses the three incompatible properties only 
successively. (Smith, 1993, 174) 
In what follows I shall argue that Smith cannot account for an event or 
an inherence relation having incompatible properties successively and so 
cannot avoid a McTaggartian-type critique of his tensed theory of time. 
To see what is involved, recall that Smith attempts to remove the appear- 
ance of  a contradiction in the statement "E is past, present and future" by 
interpreting it to mean that 
(1) E is present, will be past and has been furore or 
E is past, and has been future and present, or 
E is future and will be present and past. 
But this move does not avoid a contradiction. For consider the second 
disjunct in (1), namely, 
(2) E is past, and has been future and present. 
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The second and third conjuncts in (2) still harbor a contradiction. For the 
attribution of futurity and presentness to E in the past is just as contradictory 
as their attribution to E in the present, unless it is specified that E has them 
successively (or at different times) in the past. However, Smith cannot 
account for E having had the properties of futurity and presentness in 
succession. For, on his analysis, ifE has been future, then futurity inheresl 
in E andpastness now inheres2 in the inherencel of futurity in E. And ifE 
has been present, then presentness inheres1 in E, andpastness now inheres2 
in the inherence1 of presentness in E. There is, however, nothing in either of 
these two tensed facts that provides a ground for futurity having inheredl 
in E earlier than presentness inheredl in E, and thus there is nothing 
to account for E's having had the properties of futurity and presentness 
successively. Yet, without such an account the attribution of presentness 
and futurity to E in the past is contradictory. 
A similar difficulty arises regarding the third disjunct in (1): 
(3) E is future, and will be present andpast 
since it too contains a contradiction unless it is specified that E will be 
past after E will be present. But on Smith's theory, there is no basis for 
E beingfirst present and then past in the future. For, if E will be present, 
then presentness inheresl in E, and futurity now inheres2 in the inherence 
of presentness in E, and if E will be past, then pastness inheres1 in E, and 
futurity now inheres2 in the inherence1 of presentness in E. Unfortunately, 
nothing in either of those two tensed facts entail that E will exemplify past- 
ness after it exemplifies presentness, and without a ground for succession, 
the contradiction involved in presentness and pastness inhering in E (in the 
future) remains. 
Smith cannot avoid these arguments by distinguishing different degrees 
of pastness or futurity, e.g., being past by two hours or being future by 
two hours. For i fE was future earlier than E was present, then on Smith's 
analysis that would imply that, say, being past by two hours presently 
inheres2 in the inherencel of futurity in E is earlier than being past by 
one hour presently inheres2 in the inherencel of presentness in E. That, 
however, implies a contradiction, since Smith maintains both that "the B- 
relations of earlier and later obtain between two events only if at least one 
of the events is not present" (1993, 197; emphasis added), and that i f"E 
was future earlier than E was present", is true, then the B-relation of earlier 
than obtains between the present inherence of being past by 2 hours . . .  in 
E, and the present inherence of the being past by 1 hour . . ,  in E. In other 
words, on Smith's analysis the temporal relation of earlier than obtains 
between two events that are present and that is absurd. 3 
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There remains the first disjunct in (1) namely, 
(4) E is now present, will be past, and was future. 
In order to avoid McTaggart's paradox and account for an event having 
its A-properties successively, Smith must show that (4) is consistent, and 
adequately reflects the passage of time and the direction of change. In what 
follows, I will attempt to demonstrate that he is unable to do so. 
Consider the sentence "Event E will be past". On Smith's analysis, this 
means that the inherence of pastness in E is such that futurity now inheres 
in it. To state the same analysis somewhat differently, E exemplifies1 
pastness, and exemplificationl exemplifies2 futurity, and exemplification2 
exemplifies3 presentness. As Smith himself puts it: 
If E is now present, then it will be past. This latter clause means that futurity inheres in the 
pastness of E. But when does futurity inhere in the pastness of E ? . . .  Futurity now inheres 
in the pastness of E . . . .  In terms of property-inherences, this means that presentness inheres 
in the inherence of  futurity in the inherence of pastness in E. (1993, p. 171; my emphasis 
in the last sentence.) 
What I wish to argue is that on Smith's analysis o f"E  will be past" either a 
vicious infinite regress ensues since it implies a contradiction that cannot 
be resolved by appealing an infinite regress of  inherence relations, or he 
cannot account for the direction of  time. 
The crucial - and fatal - move in Smith's analysis is the claim that the 
inherence2 of  futurity in the inherence1 of pastness in E, is present. For 
if the second order inherence, or exemplification2, is now present, then 
it exists now. If, however, exemplification2 exists now, then the term, in 
this case exemplification1, that exemplifies2 futurity, must also exist now. 
(I am (for the moment) assuming that if an inherence or exemplification 
"relation" (of any level i) exists now, then there must also exist now a term 
that exemplifies/a property.) Consequently, if the "tie" (exemplification2) 
between exemplification1 and futurity exists now, then it must be the case 
that exemplificationl exists now. However, if exemplification1 exists now, 
then it must be present. Since, by hypothesis, exemplification1 is future, it 
follows that exemplification is both present and future, or does now exist 
and does not now exist, and that is a contradiction. 
It is no use trying to avoid this contradiction by claiming that (a) 
exemplificationl is future and will be present, or (b) exemplificationl is 
present and was future, or (c) exemplification1 is past and was present 
and (still earlier) future. In the first place, (a) contradicts the original 
assumption that E is now present, and (b) contradicts the assumption that 
E will be past. For if exemplificationl is future, then it cannot exemplify2 
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presentness as it must if E is now present. On the other hand, if we sup- 
pose that exemplification1 is now present, meaning that exemplifications 
exemplifies2 presentness, and exemplification2 exemplifies3 presentness, 
then exemplification1 cannot now exemplify2 the property of futurity and 
that contradicts the assumption that E will be past. Finally, (c) contradicts 
the assumption that E was future. For if exemplificationl is past, then 
exemplification1 exemplifies2 pastness and exemplification2 exemplifies3 
presentness. However, if exemplification2 exemplifies presentness then 
not only exemplification2, but also exemplification1, must exist now. That, 
however, contradicts the assumption that E was future, that exemplification l 
is past. For if exemplification1 now exists then it must exemplify2 present- 
ness. 
Thus, Smith's account of tensed exemplification does not explain how 
an event (or the inherence of an A-property in an event) can have the 
properties of pastness, presentness, and futurity successively. However, if 
an event or inherence relation must have its monadic temporal proper- 
ties nonsuccessively, then the contradiction and ensuing vicious infinite 
regress contains reasonable grounds for inferring, as McTaggart did, that 
A-properties do not exist. 
Of course, it is open to Smith to reject what I have assumed to be a 
principle, namely, that only what exists now can now exemplify a property. 
In other words, he might claim that on the tensed theory it is a fundamental 
principle that an event or an inherence (or exemplification) relation can 
exemplify a temporal property at a time at which it does not exist. However, 
if Smith rejects the principle in question, then he is involved in another 
difficulty. For if the inherence1 ofpastness in E does not exist when futurity 
inheres2 in it, and E does not exist when it exemplifies1 pastness, then how 
can pastness inhere in E? The ontological ground ofpastness inhering in E 
would be the property ofpastness, and the inherence2 of futurity, but it is 
difficult to see how that could be the ground of the truth of"E wilt be past". 
How can it be true now that the pastness of E is future, if all that exists 
now is the property ofpastness, and the exemplification of futurity? There 
is nothing (E) that exists that exemplifies pastness, and nothing now exists 
that exemplifies futurity. So, Smith's analysis is faced with a dilemma. If 
we accept the intuitively plausible principle that an entity (in particular the 
relation of inherence) can cxemplify a property only if it exists, it follows 
that first order inherence relations have incompatible temporal properties 
nonsuccessively. On the other hand, if Smith rejects that principle then, 
when E will be past, neither E nor the inherence ofpastness in E exist. Thus, 
the truth of "Event E will be past" does not have a sufficient ontological 
ground. 
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The dilemma I just raised is closely connected with another. Recall, the 
passage of time, and its direction, is reflected in the notion that: 
What is present was future and will be past. 
This sentence implies that what was first future, became present and then 
became past, rather than the other way around. However, Smith's analysis 
of the states of affairs described by (5) E will be past, (6) E is now present 
and (7) E was future, is inadequate to account for the direction of time 
and change. For the ontological analysis of (5) does not contain E or the 
exemplification1 of pastness by E, but only a second level exemplification 
relation and the properties of pastness and futurity. Analogously, (7) does 
not contain E or the exemplification1 of futurity by E, but only a second 
level exemplification relation, and the properties of pastness and futurity. 
Thus, the facts that E will be past, and E was future contain the same con- 
stituents, namely, a second level inherence or exemplification relation and 
the properties ofpastness and futurity. What, then, could be the ontological 
ground of the difference between (5) and (7) and the basis for E's being 
first future, then present and then past, or E's being future before being 
present or past? The direction of the change in E from future to present to 
past, rather than the other way around seems to be left unaccounted for. 4 
Thus, Smith is impaled on the horns of a dilemma. Either he accepts the 
intuitively plausible principle that an entity can now exemplify a property 
only if it exists now or he does not. If he accepts the principle, then a 
contradiction ensues since the same inherence relation has incompatible 
temporal characteristics nonsuccessively. On the other hand, if he denies 
the principle, his ontological assay of facts described by sentences like (5) 
and (7) fail to ground the direction of time and change. The only way he 
could do so would be by appealing to facts of the sort described by (6) E 
is now present. However, before such facts can provide an account of the 
direction of time, Smith would need to give a direction to the multitude 
of facts of that form. But if the argument of this section is sound, then 
Smith's analysis of  the tenses will be insufficient to accomplish that task. 
Thus, in order to avoid McTaggart's paradox and provide a ground for 
the direction of time, Smith must countenance tenseless temporal relations 
between terms that exist and are located at some time t without tensed 
properties. That is, he must abandon the tensed theory of time. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Clearly, my arguments, even if they are sound, would not tilt the balance 
conclusively in favor of the tenseless theory of time. There may be other 
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more plausible attempts to avoid McTaggart 's  paradox, and the tenseless 
theory is not without its difficulties. This essay should, however, bring 
one central issue o f  the debate sharper into focus. The tenseless theorist 
maintains that the tensed theory is dialectically inadequate, being unable to 
account  for or ground the reality o f  time, understood in terms o f  temporal  
relations between and among events. The tensed theory insists that temporal  
passage must constitute the core o f  t ime because there are indisputable 
phenomena,  such as our experience o f  time and temporal  passage, that 
can only be accounted for by  appealing to the NOW. I f  the tenseless 
view can account  for our experience o f  time and change (and I believe 
it can) 5 then together with my critique o f  recent tensed theories o f  time, 
the weight  o f  philosophical argument would tip the balance on the side o f  
the tenseless theory. On the other hand, i f  the detenser cannot expound an 
adequate account  o f  our experience o f  time, then the urgency to provide 
a consistent and illuminating version o f  the tensed theory will be all the 
more pressing. 6,7 
NOTES 
i McTaggart's essay was originally published in (1908) and reprinted in (1934). All page 
references to this article will be from (1934). Cf  McTaggart (1927). 
2 For Smith's most sustained defense of the tensed theory see (Smith 1993). Other recent 
tensed theories that attempt to deal with McTaggart's paradox are found in Schlesinger 
( 1991 ), (1993) and (1994), Bigelow (199 t), and Zeilicovici ( 1989). Bigelow and Schtesinger 
both attempt to avoid the view that temporal becoming is contradictory by appealing to the 
notion of possible worlds. For criticisms of Bigelow's theory, many of which also apply 
to Schlesinger's, see Oaklander, (1994c). Zeilicovici proposes the idea that we can explain 
temporal becoming even if we reject the idea of the moving NOW as a property that moves 
along the series of events. I criticize Zeilicovici in Oaklander (1992). For a criticism of 
Prior-type theories of tensed time see Oaklander (1984) and Smith (1993). 
McTaggart's paradox has been recently discussed in a debate between E. J. Lowe, Hugh 
Mellor and Robin Le Poidevin. Cf  Le Poidevin and Mellor (1987a), Le Poidevin (1991, 
1993), and Lowe (1987a, 1987b, 1992, 1993). Although Lowe argues against McTaggart's 
negative thesis, and claims to defend a tensed theory of time, his own account of the meta- 
physical significance of the tenses is too skeletal to be considered in this paper. 
3 In (1993, p. 171) Smith explicitly introduces earlier and later into his analysis of the 
tenses since he claims that the tensed theory implies "E is present, was future and will be 
past, or E is future, and was present and (still earlier) was past and E is future, will be 
present and will be (still later) past". However, if my argument of the past few pages is 
correct, then these B-terms cannot perform the function for which they were introduced, 
namely, to provide an ontological ground for an event having incompatible A-properties 
successively (in the past or in the future). 
4 Smith might reply to this argument by claiming that what distinguishes the two tensed 
facts (5) and (7) is that one contains the inherence2 of futurity and the other contains the 
inherence2 of pastness. What, then, is the ground of the temporal relation of E's being 
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future before E's being past? He cannot say that it involves a temporal relation between 
the inherence2 of futurity and the inherence2 of pastness, since both inherence relations 
are present, and the B-relation of earlier than cannot obtain between items that are both 
present. Indeed, it seems to me that in Smith's ontology, there are no temporal relations 
at all because he maintains that only what is past, present or future exists (Smith 1993, p. 
165), and he is committed to the view that temporal relations are not past, present or future. 
For, being earlier than is a first order relation and therefore, if it had any A-properties, then 
they would be second-order properties. But Smith says that A-properties are first-order 
properties. It follows that they cannot be exemplified by B-relations which, therefore, do 
not exist. 
5 For recent tenseless accounts of time and experience, as well as criticisms of those 
accounts, see (Oaklander and Smith 1994, Pt. III). 
6 Upon completing this paper I have come across another recent defense of the tensed theory 
of time (Markosian 1993). A consideration of Markosian's views will, however, have to 
wait for another occasion. 
7 I wish to thank Quentin Smith and an anonymous referee for Synthese for their very 
helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
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